Dostęp otwarty
ODSTRASZAJĄCY EFEKT OPÓŹNIONEJ INFORMACJI ZWROTNEJ NA NIEUCZCIWOŚĆ
Łukasz Markiewicz1, Katarzyna Idzikowska2, Przemysław Sawicki3
Język publikacji: polski
artykuł naukowy
Redaktorzy Gościnni Numeru Tomasz Herudziński, Wojciech Mincewicz
Transformacje Nr 4(127)2025, Data publikacji: 30 grudnia 2025r.
Słowa kluczowe: odstraszanie, instytucje, nieuczciwość, kara, niepewność
Streszczenie Classical deterrence theory posits that punishment must be certain, severe, and swift to effectively discourage norm violations. Using cheating as a norm violation of honesty, we empirically tested hypotheses inspired by deterrence theory, focusing specifically on the swiftness of punishment. We examined whether the timing of sanction information (immediate vs. delayed feedback about inspection outcomes) influences the propensity to cheat. Psychological research offers two theories that could contribute to this mechanism. First, anticipatory aversion theory suggests that awaiting possible sanctions induces negative affect, making the waiting period itself aversive. Thus, delaying information about inspections should deter dishonesty. Second, emotional reinforcement mechanisms suggest that unpunished dishonesty produces a brief positive affect (“cheater’s high”). Immediate confirmation that one’s lie will go undetected may reinforce dishonest behavior, thereby encouraging further cheating in multi-round tasks. To test these ideas, we employed a modified Die Rolling Task (DIRT), in which participants observed computer-generated die rolls and reported outcomes. Across rounds, we varied the profitability of lying, the probability of inspection, and the severity of sanctions. Crucially, we manipulated swiftness: in the INFO condition, feedback about audits was given after each round; in the NO INFO condition, feedback was postponed until all rounds were completed. Results replicated the core tenets of deterrence theory: cheating increased with higher financial incentives, decreased with greater inspection probability, and decreased with harsher penalties. Importantly, we also found that delayed feedback exerted a stronger deterrent effect than immediate feedback. These findings suggest that be-yond certainty and severity, the subjective experience of waiting for punishment may serve as an additional deterrent mechanism: delayed punishment may operate as a psychological “tax” on dishonesty, particularly when uncertainty about detection remains salient.
Ph.D. , Kozminski University, Warsaw, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0003-4554-1559
E-mail: lmarkiewicz@kozminski.edu.pl
Ph.D.., Kozminski University, Warsaw, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0002-0689-5285
E-mail: kidzikowska@kozminski.edu.pl
Ph.D., Kozminski University, Warsaw, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0002-3345-5015
E-mail: psawicki@kozminski.edu.pl